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The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal
Rules on Bargaining Behavior: The Case
of No-Fault Divorce
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and Jonathan Baron
ABSTRACT
We hypothesize that the no-fault divorce law is in conflict with moral intuitions favoring
punishment for people who break the marriage contract and that people will be either unwilling
or unable to fully ignore marital fault in the context of divorce settlement negotiations. In
four Web-based experiments, we asked subjects to read vignettes about divorcing couples and
then to rate proposals by each party about how to divide the marital property. Under instruc-
tions to ignore fault, subjects nonetheless rated wrongdoers’ proposals lower than victims’
proposals. Some subjects ignored fault purposely, while others were unaware of their own
bias. We also find evidence of self-serving bias; subjects taking the perspective of a victim
showed more fault-based bias than did subjects taking the perspective of a wrongdoer. We
conclude that under certain conditions of unilateral fault, the no-fault divorce law may actually
increase the likelihood of impasse in divorce negotiations.
1. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars, most notably Robert Ellickson (1991), have suggested
that individuals often ignore, misunderstand, or even consciously flout
laws that violate social or moral norms. Ellickson argues that one of
the failures of traditional law and economics analyses is that they do
not account for the role of informal norms in real-life negotiations. In
this article, we present an empirical study of the role of moral norms
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in private negotiations. In particular, we are interested in the situation
in which a person’s moral intuitions are in conflict with the legal rule.
Thus, for this series of experiments, we have chosen to consider the case
of divorce bargaining. Laws of divorce property division prohibit parties
from taking marital fault into account. However, fault is, obviously, a
very salient property of divorce.
Our hypothesis is that the conflict between the moral norm against
marital misconduct and the legal rule of no-fault property division may
disrupt efficient bargaining. For these experiments, we assume that there
are costs to a bargaining impasse, because litigation is much more ex-
pensive than private settlement. We predict that in a certain subset of
cases—namely, cases in which one party has unilaterally breached the
marriage contract—parties will be less likely to bargain efficiently in a
no-fault divorce regime, and divorce negotiations will reach an impasse
with greater frequency.
We ask subjects to consider a variety of hypothetical divorce sce-
narios, especially situations in which one person is clearly at fault (for
example, adultery, abandonment, or deception). Subjects evaluate a se-
ries of bargaining proposals made by either the wrongdoer or the victim
of wrongdoing; their task is to rate each proposal’s reasonableness.
The first two experiments demonstrate that subjects rate the same
offers as more reasonable when proposed by victims instead of wrong-
doers. In the third and fourth experiments, we show that some subjects
flout the legal instructions on purpose but that the fault effect remains
significant even for those subjects who do not intend to disfavor the
wrongdoer.
1.1. Legal Framework
There are three facets of the current legal framework of divorce that
make it an especially apt example of the phenomenon we are trying to
study, namely, the response of private parties to a legal rule that conflicts
with a moral rule. The first important fact about modern divorce is that
most settlements are privately negotiated. In a typical divorce, couples
negotiate a financial agreement detailing how they will divide their prop-
erty, and a judge signs off on the agreement, usually with minimal, if
any, oversight (Mnookin 1986). Those unable to reach a private settle-
ment agreement go to court, incurring substantial litigation costs in order
to receive a judge-made settlement. Thus, divorce bargaining is a private
negotiation that takes place “in the shadow of the law” (Mnookin and
Kornhauser 1979). Under a traditional economic analysis, this means
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that rational parties will not agree to a distribution amounting to less
than what they would receive in a judge-made settlement (minus the
costs of litigation). Like Ellickson, we are interested here in how informal
norms might push people to violate this economic equation.
The second fact of modern divorce law is that it is somewhat inde-
terminate. The standard for the division of property is that it should be
“equitable,” and equity is based on a variety of ill-defined, unweighted
factors, including the duration of the marriage, contributions to the
financial assets, the needs of each party, and even the parties’ individual
contributions to housework and child care. There is no algorithm by
which parties can ascertain how a judge would divide the property.
Finally, and most important, modern divorce law is largely no fault.
This means that the one clear instruction is that the property be divided
“without regard to marital misconduct.” Under these rules, then, the
parties have a vague sense of what considerations they should include
in their decision making, combined with a clear prohibition on one of
the most salient issues in the divorce, namely, who is to blame. Our
contention is that the question of blame will continue to affect bargaining
behavior even when there are instructions to ignore it.
To determine whether knowledge of marital fault does, in fact, affect
negotiating behavior when there are instructions to ignore fault, we
compare subjects’ responses to settlement proposals (for example, “Let’s
sell the house and divide the profits fifty-fifty”) as a function of who
makes the proposal: a wrongdoer, a neutral party, or a victim.
1.2. Fairness and Punishment
Family law practitioners report anecdotally that their divorce clients are
incredulous when they learn that the divorce system lacks an official
mechanism for assigning blame. A question motivating this research is
whether people will opt to punish transgressors privately when there is
no state sanction. One way that people could take fault into account is
by purposely flouting a law perceived to produce an unfair result. The
wronged party may simply prefer to incur the cost of litigation in order
to punish the wrongdoer. A wife whose husband is leaving her for an-
other woman, for example, finds her husband’s proposal that they sell
their house and divide the money entirely unreasonable: why should she,
who did not initiate the separation, be forced to move out of her house
as well? Even knowing that the law supports his position (assuming it
is reasonable by other standards), she may prefer to make him choose
from two costly options: accede to her demands or take her to court.
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There is a substantial literature in psychology and experimental eco-
nomics documenting people’s willingness to punish others, at a cost to
themselves, for behavior perceived as unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler 1986). One conclusion from this line of research is that people
would rather sacrifice material wealth (say, 25 percent of the total pie)
than accept an unfair outcome. Economic theory predicts that the par-
ties’ contributions and misbehaviors should be irrelevant because they
are basically sunk costs, but in fact individuals are very sensitive to the
justice of the distribution and are willing to lose money by decreasing
the total pie (with, for example, protracted litigation) just to ensure that
the size of the slices is fair.
In this study, we assume that a low rating of a proposal’s reason-
ableness (which is explicitly linked, in the description of the ratings, with
an intent to reject the offer) is one way to indicate a desire to punish.
In order to assess whether some subjects consciously punish, we ask
subjects a series of questions about their approach to the scenarios,
including whether they ever consciously went against the law to express
disapproval of the wrongdoer. We also compare the fault effect in sub-
jects who report an intentional or explicit bias to those subjects who
report relative impartiality.
1.3. Moral Heuristics
This research investigates the role of fault as a heuristic. Fault is a salient
factor in a divorce. One way to think about marital wrongdoing is as
a moral transgression; one party breached the marriage contract by lying,
cheating, or breaking a promise. The relevant moral rule-of-thumb,
which is not necessarily bad or wrong, is that a person who breaks the
marriage contract should be sanctioned. Even those who try to ignore
fault may be biased against the wrongdoer nonetheless. These judgments
are complicated. A couple’s house, for example, is an asset, but during
the marriage, it has expressive and emotional meaning. When people
have to start thinking in terms of dollars, the calculation of its worth
becomes more difficult. The same bargaining position may simply feel
more or less reasonable depending on who holds it, the wrongdoer or
the victim.
Moral intuitions affect a variety of judgments. Consumers have moral
opinions that in turn affect purchasing decisions (Baron 1999). Voters
and policy makers make moral judgments that affect the allocation of
public resources (Skitka and Tetlock 1992). Sunstein (2005) has recently
posited a subset of biases and heuristics that affect not assessments of
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fact but rather assessments of moral judgment or opinion, particularly
judgments relevant for matters of law and policy. Sunstein argues that
moral heuristics will produce faulty moral reasoning when moral intu-
itions are overgeneralized or overweighted in the judgment process. This
framework is helpful for thinking about divorce negotiations under no-
fault divorce rules. A moral heuristic almost certainly favors honoring
the marriage contract and punishing the person who broke the contract.
However, overreliance on this heuristic could be counterproductive for
parties trying to reach the most efficient outcome.
Sunstein et al. (2002) document a particularly relevant phenomenon
termed the “outrage heuristic”: “Punishment judgments are rooted in a
simple heuristic, to the effect that penalties should be a proportional
response to the outrageousness of the act” (Sunstein 2005, p. 538). As
such, people are willing to punish nonhuman entities like corporations
in the same manner that they would punish individually culpable human
beings, and they are more or less indifferent to the consequences of a
given punishment, as long as the punishment fits the crime (Baron and
Ritov 1993). There is no legal mechanism in a divorce for assigning
blame or meting out appropriate punishment; it seems safe to assume,
however, that the outrage factor often plays an important role. If divorce
negotiations permit one party to punish the other, even when the pun-
ishment is costly, that may be the only outlet for the expression of moral
outrage. Furthermore, outrage is increased as a function of betrayal.
When the moral violation involves a breach of trust, it is especially awful.
We do not mean to argue against the soundness of this particular moral
intuition, only to note that it may be poorly served by the limited,
mutually costly punishment mechanisms available in divorce bargaining.
In order to explore whether this heuristic affects subjects’ judgments
in the divorce context, we identify a subset of subjects who report a low
bias and an intention to follow the no-fault instructions. We then com-
pare reasonableness ratings for victims’ proposals to those for wrong-
doers’ proposals in this subset of subjects to determine if these subjects
still show the (apparently nonconscious, unintentional) fault effect.
1.4. Self-Serving Biases
In order for these fault-based fairness concerns to cause a bargaining
impasse, though, there must be some reason to think that the two parties
will not have identical intuitions and biases. In other words, there would
be no apparent problem if both the wrongdoer and the victim of wrong-
doing tended to be biased toward the victim. They would reach an
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agreement that was generous to the victim. This is an unlikely result,
though, in light of research findings on self-serving biases. Numerous
studies of bargaining find that individuals find facts and arguments in
their own favor to be more important than evidence supporting the
opposite position (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997). In the case of di-
vorce, the self-serving bias might lead to a bargaining impasse via two
possible routes. One possibility is that both parties are clear as to who
is at fault. The wrongdoer, however, scrupulously follows the no-fault
legal mandate. The victim, in contrast, takes a more global view of the
situation and reasons that fault should play some role in the settlement.
The other possibility is that fault itself is ambiguous, such that both
parties believe the other to be at fault. In either of these situations, the
bargainers have good-faith beliefs that they are being fair. When their
positions are rejected, they may even begin to suspect that the other is
not bargaining in good faith and start down the path to punishment via
impasse (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997).
In this study, we investigate the role of self-serving biases by asking
subjects to consider scenarios from different perspectives and by com-
paring the effect of perspective in both neutral scenarios and unilateral-
fault scenarios.
2. METHODOLOGY
In these experiments, we would like to measure whether subjects them-
selves are willing and able to comply with the legal rule, whether they
believe that legal decision makers (judges, for example) will comply with
the legal rule, and whether subjects believe that the legal rule is fair. In
order to measure whether subjects follow the no-fault rule, in experi-
ments 1, 3, and 4, we ask subjects to assume a role in each case (as a
mediator or a participant, and we specify in each instance) and to make
a judgment in accordance with the no-fault rule. Note that in these cases,
we do not ask a subject to predict what another actor would do but
rather to make the decision herself, using the no-fault instructions and
her understanding of the case and her role in it. In experiments 2 and
4, we ask subjects about their beliefs about how a judge would respond
to the case. Thus, we want to know not what the subject would do were
the subject a divorce court judge but rather the subjects’ perceptions of
a judge’s compliance with the no-fault law.
Our subject pool draws from a group of lay adults with a demo-
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graphic profile that parallels Americans in general. Subjects are paid a
small amount (between $3 and $8) to complete the questionnaires online.
We chose to use a sample of American adults rather than college students.
By doing this, we are able to use subjects with a wide range of educa-
tional attainment. Furthermore, it just made more sense to use adults,
many of whom had experience with marriage and divorce, to tap into
moral norms about the marriage contract. We chose not to use lawyers
and judges much for the same reason; most people who get divorced
are not intimately acquainted with the legal rules, much less the eco-
nomic analysis of negotiation.
3. EXPERIMENT 1
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Subjects. A total of 109 participants completed a questionnaire
on the World Wide Web; they were paid $5 for participation. Participants
ranged in age from 19 to 66 (mean age of 41); 22 percent were male.
A total of 42 percent were married and had never been divorced, 26
percent had never been married, 17 percent were divorced and were not
remarried, and 15 percent had been divorced and were remarried. One
subject with unusually fast response times was omitted.
3.1.2. Procedure. The questionnaire began:
In the following 12 scenarios, you will be presented with scenarios in-
volving divorcing couples in the midst of negotiating a separation agree-
ment. Each scenario has 6 proposals for how to divide the property, and
you will rate the reasonableness of each proposal by itself. Basically, the
couples need to decide what they will do with the house, how they will
divide the money in their joint bank account, and what they will do with
other joint possessions of significant value (e.g., cars, furniture, jewelry).
State law permits them to consider each other’s contributions to the
household as a guide to property division. So, for example, they could
take into account that John’s income was used to purchase his car or that
Mary has done substantial renovations on the house.
However, this is a no-fault divorce state, so any problems they had
during their marriage or any blame about the divorce should not factor
into their decisions about dividing property. If they cannot come to an
agreement, they will have to go to court and let a judge decide who gets
what.
Please rate each proposal on a 1 to 7 scale of reasonableness, where 1
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p very unreasonable, this proposal should be rejected as totally insuffi-
cient; 4 p somewhat reasonable, depending on how other property gets
divided; 7 p so reasonable it’s downright generous, this proposal should
be accepted immediately.
Each screen (of a total of 72) asked subjects to rate a single proposal.
This is a sample screen:
Consider this case from the perspective of an impartial judge.
Sara and John have been married for ten years, and they have no chil-
dren. Sara has revealed that she is gay. Sara was attracted to members of
the same sex even before marriage, but she never confided in John, and
this revelation comes as a complete surprise to John. Sara has now filed
for divorce.
John proposes that they each keep the car they were accustomed to
driving; he will keep the Toyota SUV and Sara will keep the Honda station
wagon.
Imagine that you are an impartial judge. How reasonable do you think
this proposal is?
All six proposals for a given scenario, three from each party, were pre-
sented consecutively, but the order of the scenarios was random across
subjects. Three variables were randomized for each scenario: type of
divorce (unilateral fault or neither party at fault), gender of the wrong-
doer, and perspective (husband, wife, or judge). Thus, each scenario had
a version in which one party was clearly at fault and another in which
neither party was really at fault. There were 12 different scenarios. They
were as follows: adultery, sexuality, failure to provide, refusal of sex,
abandonment, cruelty, meanness to stepchildren, broken contract, bro-
ken financial contract, crime, financial irresponsibility, and alcoholism.
In the adultery scenario, for example, the two fault conditions (uni-
lateral fault and no fault) read as follows:
Tom and Joanna have been married for ten years, and they have no chil-
dren. Tom recently revealed that he has been having an affair with a
colleague and is leaving Joanna. Tom has already retained a lawyer and
filed for divorce.
Tom and Joanna have been married for ten years, and they have no chil-
dren. They have been growing apart for some time, and recently both
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Tom and Joanna have revealed to the other that they have fallen in love
with someone else.1
When one party was at fault, it could be either the husband or the wife
in a given scenario for a given subject. (In the adultery scenario, for
example, some subjects read about Joanna’s affair and others about
Tom’s affair.) We also asked subjects to consider the proposals from the
point of view of a particular party: the husband, the wife, or an impartial
judge. For each item in these scenarios, we are interested in four vari-
ables: whose perspective is being taken, which party is making the pro-
posal, what kind of divorce it is (unilateral fault or neutral), and, if it
is a unilateral-fault divorce, which party is at fault. In our analyses, we
often look at the data in terms of combinations of these variables. So,
for example, we might want to look at the difference between ratings
of wrongdoers’ proposals and ratings of victims’ proposals in unilateral-
fault scenarios; then we look at items in which the party making the
proposal is the same as the party at fault and compare it with items for
which the proposer is different from the party at fault. (Each proposal
is analyzed as one item.)
In this experiment, the first 34 respondents encountered an error in
one of the scenarios (meanness to stepchildren), and those responses
were omitted. In these analyses, we also omitted the crime scenario. In
the unilateral-fault version of the crime scenario, one of the parties em-
bezzles money, drives the couple to bankruptcy, and goes to jail. This
is not a valid scenario for our purposes, because this is the kind of fault
that could be considered under the law. A judge can award a lesser
portion to the party responsible for diminution of the joint assets. Since
most people (correctly) intuit that the person at fault in this situation
should get less money, including this group of items biases the results
in favor of our hypothesis.
3.2. Results
Table 1 shows the overall means for each condition. Fault had an effect
on subjects’ ratings of the settlement proposals; a wrongdoer’s proposal
was evaluated as less reasonable than a victim’s proposal on the 7-point
scale. Our first analysis compared, by subject, ratings of different pro-
posals as a function of the proposer (who was either a victim or a
1. The complete questionnaire is available online (Divorce Cases (div1a) [http://
finzi.psych.upenn.edu/∼baron/ex/tess/div1.htm]).
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Table 1. Mean Ratings of Proposals by Proposer and Perspective
Proposer’s
Perspective
Spouse’s
Perspective
Judge’s
Perspective
Victim’s proposal 5.26 4.30 4.71
Wrongdoer’s proposal 4.96 4.01 4.39
Neutral party’s proposal 5.05 4.32 4.72
wrongdoer). We also analyzed the data by scenario and by item, com-
paring the responses of subjects who saw a given scenario or proposal
in one of two conditions, one in which the husband is at fault and one
in which the wife is at fault. The main effect of fault was significant
across subjects ( , , ); the average subjectt p 4.296 df p 108 p ! .0001
rated proposals made by victims about one-third of a point (.326) higher
than the score for proposals made by wrongdoers. The effect of fault
was not significantly different for male and female subjects ( ,t p 1.131
, ). However, female subjects showed a preferencedf p 44.268 p p .2641
for women’s proposals overall (mean difference p .319, ,t p 5.108
, ), whereas men showed no preference (mean differencedf p 84 p ! .0001
p .005, , , ; test of differences is significant:t p .052 df p 23 p p .9588
, , ). Subjects distinguished betweent p 2.582 df p 41.08 p p .0135
wrongdoers’ proposals and the proposals of parties to a nonfault divorce
(hereinafter called a neutral divorce), rating wrongdoers’ proposals
about a quarter point (.244) lower than the score for neutral parties’
proposals ( , , ). Although the direction wast p 3.545 df p 108 p p .0006
as expected, there was no significant difference by subject between rat-
ings of victims’ proposals and ratings of neutral parties’ proposals (mean
difference p .082; , , ). The test of dif-t p 1.4914 df p 108 p p .1388
ferences is not significant, however: the difference in ratings between
neutral parties’ proposals and wrongdoers’ proposals is not significantly
greater than the difference in ratings between neutral parties’ proposals
and victims’ proposals ( , , ). However, whent p 1.635 df p 108 p p .1049
subjects took the perspective of a judge, their ratings of neutral parties’
proposals (mean p 4.72) were significantly closer to their ratings of
victims’ proposals (mean p 4.71) than to ratings of wrongdoers’ pro-
posals (mean p 4.39) (test of differences: , ,t p 2.032 df p 108 p p
). In other words, judges treated victims the same as they treated.0447
parties to a neutral divorce, but they disfavored wrongdoers.
We tested each item across subjects, comparing the responses of sub-
jects assigned to one of two conditions, one in which the wrongdoer
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makes the proposal and one in which the victim makes the proposal.
The mean difference across subjects, aggregated across items, was .264
( , , ). However, the items are not entirelyt p 3.254 df p 65 p p .0018
independent, as subjects are responding to six questions within the same
11 scenarios.
The effect of perspective was also highly significant. We first com-
pared ratings of “own” proposals with ratings of “other’s” proposals,
collapsing across fault conditions (husband’s fault, wife’s fault, no one’s
fault); in other words, we compared the overall ratings of items in which
perspective and proposer are congruent (own) and the ratings of items
in which perspective and proposer are incongruent (other’s; for example,
take the wife’s perspective and rate the husband’s proposal). This dif-
ference was highly significant, with a mean difference of .852 (t p
, , ). We then tested the difference between7.496 df p 108 p ! .0001
judge’s ratings and ratings of own proposals. Subjects show a significant
effect of perspective, rating proposals .432 higher when they take the
perspective of the proposer than when they take the perspective of an
impartial judge ( , , ). And subjects are mucht p 4.703 df p 108 p ! .0001
harder on a proposal, rating it .420 lower, when they take the point of
view of the spouse than when they take the point of view of the judge
( , , ).t p 5.741 df p 108 p ! .0001
The effect of perspective (the difference in the mean rating of own
and other’s proposals) was significantly greater in unilateral-fault sce-
narios than in neutral scenarios. For victims, the effect of perspective
was greater than it was for wrongdoers (mean p .592, ,t p 3.2918
, ). In other words, victims rated their own proposalsdf p 108 p p .0013
about 1.25 points higher than they rated a spouse’s proposal, but wrong-
doers rated their own proposals only about .66 points higher than they
rated a spouse’s proposal. Subjects taking the perspective of the wrong-
doer (.66) and subjects taking the perspective of a party to a neutral
divorce (.73) did not differ significantly as to the effect of perspective
( , , ), but subjects taking the perspective oft p .5205 df p 108 p p .6038
the victim were much more biased in favor of their own proposals and
against a spouse’s proposals ( , , ). Wrong-t p 4.1355 df p 108 p ! .0001
doers’ responses were significantly more similar to neutral parties’ re-
sponses than were victim’s responses ( , ,t p 2.1901 df p 108 p p
)..0307
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4. EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we modified the method of the first experiment. Here
we are interested in how subjects respond to unilateral-fault divorces
under no-fault divorce laws. In order to be sure that subjects fully un-
derstand the difference between a fault-based divorce and a no-fault
divorce, they answer the same questions for each scenario four times:
once as though they were permitted to account for fault and again under
the no-fault rules and, within each of these categories, once with the
wife at fault and once with the husband at fault. Finally, in this exper-
iment the participants are always asked to consider the proposal in light
of a judge’s response. If some people believe that fault should be taken
into account in divorce negotiations, they may also believe that the judge
will see things their way, thus making the possibility of a judge-made
settlement more attractive. The design of this experiment is entirely
within-subject; subjects saw each of the eight scenarios in all four per-
mutations of a of fault (husband’s or wife’s) and law (fault based2 # 2
or no fault).
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Subjects. A total of 105 participants responded to a survey on
the World Wide Web; they were paid $8 for participation. A total of 8
subjects were omitted because their response times were so fast, leaving
97 for analysis. The ages ranged from 24 to 78 (mean 43), and 22 percent
were male.
4.1.2. Procedure. Subjects read these instructions:
In this experiment, you will be presented with 32 scenarios involving
divorcing couples who have gone to court. A judge will rule on how they
should divide their property. The judge decides what to do with joint
property like the house, the bank account, and other valuable possessions.
In each case, spouses submit proposals or requests to the judge, asking
for property or certain ways of dividing the property. You will be asked
to imagine what the judge would do to be fair and follow state law.
No-Fault Divorce Laws:
In all cases, the judge is trying to be fair and equitable to both parties.
However, many states are “no fault” divorce states; in those states, the
judge knows the reasons for the divorce, but those reasons cannot be
reflected in the property division. The judge must use other factors, like
each person’s financial contributions to the marriage, or who owned which
property before they got married, in order to decide what is fair.
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Fault-Based Divorce Laws:
In other states, certain divorces are “fault” divorces, which means that
one person is deemed at fault. In those cases, the judge is allowed to make
decisions in light of a party’s fault in the divorce.
How Will the Judge Respond?
For each proposal, please estimate the judge’s response on a scale from
1 to 7, where 1 p totally unreasonable, judge will not even consider this
proposal; 4 p somewhat reasonable request that the judge will evaluate
in light of all other requests; and 7 p very reasonable—even generous to
the other party—so the judge will almost definitely grant.
The 32 scenarios consist of 8 basic scenarios repeated 4 times, with 6
questions after each.2
The eight scenarios in this experiment included two adultery situa-
tions, abandonment, cruelty, broken contract, broken financial contract,
crime, and alcoholism. (As in the previous experiment, the crime scenario
was omitted.) Each scenario was constant across proposals; subjects saw
the scenario story at the top of the screen, and they rated the proposals,
presented in random order within the scenario, sequentially. Only one
proposal was shown at a time. The order of the scenarios was random-
ized across subjects, as was the order of conditions.
4.2. Results
Marital wrongdoing affected subjects’ predictions of the judge’s reaction
in both fault and no-fault states (see Table 2 for the means). The effect
was, predictably, quite large for fault states (mean difference p .933,
, , ), and, in fact, it was significantly largert p 9.607 df p 96 p ! .0001
than the effect in no-fault states ( , , ). How-t p 6.652 df p 96 p ! .0001
ever, fault still had a significant effect on predictions of judicial response
when subjects were instructed that the judge could not take fault into
account (mean difference p .339, , , ). Resultst p 6.366 df p 96 p ! .0001
were significant for both male and female subjects, and there were no
effects of subject gender ( , , ).t p .7084 df p 32.781 p p .484
5. EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment, the goal is to replicate and extend the main finding
of the first two experiments, namely, that people take fault into account
2. The complete questionnaire is available online (Divorce Cases (div2a) [http://
finzi.psych.upenn.edu/∼baron/ex/tess/div2.htm]).
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Table 2. Mean Ratings of Proposals, by Legal Rule and Proposer
Wrongdoers’
Proposals
Victims’
Proposals
No-fault law 4.32 4.66
Fault-based law 4.03 4.96
in making these quantitative assessments, even when they are instructed
not to. Here we are interested in why people show an effect of fault.
Are they consciously punishing the wrongdoer, or are they unaware of
the extent to which fault biases their responses?
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Subjects. A total of 79 participants responded to a questionnaire
on the World Wide Web; they were paid $3 for participation. The ages
ranged from 19 to 69 (mean 41.9), and 25 percent of the respondents
were male.
5.1.2. Procedure. The questionnaire began with a description of the
task, similar to that in the first two experiments.3 Here the two relevant
conditions were the gender of the proposer and the gender of the wrong-
doer, both of which were randomized across subjects. Further instruc-
tions asked subjects to act as an impartial judge or mediator and de-
scribed the legal rules:
These couples all live in states with no-fault divorce laws. This means that
the reasons for the divorce cannot be factored in to the property division.
It does not matter if one person is clearly a victim and the other clearly
to blame. You must use other factors, like each person’s financial contri-
butions to the marriage or who owned which property before they got
married, in order to decide what is fair.
Subjects rated four proposals for each of eight scenarios (though only
seven will be analyzed, as the crime scenario was omitted). In this ex-
periment, the gender of the proposer was random (in order to make sure
that there was nothing inherent in the proposals that was affecting the
results in the previous experiments), as was the gender of the wrongdoer.
Where necessary, we edited stories and proposals to make them more
gender neutral, such that it would be plausible that either a man or a
3. The complete questionnaire is available online (Divorce Cases (div3a) [http://
finzi.psych.upenn.edu/∼baron/ex/tess/div3.htm]).
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woman could make a request. For example, we omitted proposals deal-
ing with fairly gender-specific property, like jewelry.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked five additional
questions and also had space to make any additional comments:
1. How impartial were you able to be in ignoring fault? (1 p totally
biased, 4 p impartial much of the time, but with lapses, 7 p totally
impartial)
2. Did you ever consciously go against the no-fault law to punish the
wrongdoer or help the victim in a scenario?
3. How often did your responses depend on which party was at fault
in the divorce?
4. How difficult was it to ignore the facts of each case and focus on
the law? (1 p not difficult at all, 4 p somewhat difficult, 7 p impossible)
5. Do you think that your responses will show any bias against the
wrongdoers? If yes: Why do you think you were biased?
5.2. Results
In this experiment, we replicated the results of the first two experiments,
finding a main effect of fault (mean difference p .60, ,t p 6.325 df p
, ). A total of 64.5 percent of subjects reported that they78 p ! .0001
never went against the law to punish the person at fault; 35.5 percent
reported that they did punish. A total of 58.2 percent of subjects said
that their responses would not show a bias against the wrongdoer; 41.8
percent said they would show a bias. Figures 1–3 show the distribution
of responses to the questions of the difficulty of remaining impartial,
the self-evaluation of impartiality, and the extent to which subjects took
fault into account.
Self-reported impartiality was inversely correlated with the actual
fault effect ( , , , ). To measurer p .333 t p 3.095 df p 77 p p .0027
overall impartiality, we took the final responses and aggregated them
into a single measure of impartiality (in which a higher number means
greater impartiality) and scaled the responses to account for individual
variation.
Subjects who reported that they had gone against the law ( )n p 27
showed the biggest fault effect, with a mean difference of .892 between
victims and wrongdoers on the 7-point scale ( , ,t p 6.140 df p 26 p !
), and these people ( ) showed a significantly larger effect of.0001 n p 49
fault than did those who reported that they did not go against the law
( , , ). However, even those who reportedt p 2.399 df p 60.5 p p .0195
330 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 7 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 8
Figure 1. Distribution of responses to the question, How impartial were you able to be in
ignoring fault?
that they did not go against the law to punish wrongdoers nonetheless
showed a significant fault effect, almost a half-point difference between
victims and wrongdoers (mean p .433, , , ).t p 3.48 df p 48 p p .0011
Subjects who reported that their responses would not show bias did
show a significant effect of fault (mean p .500, , ,t p 4.074 df p 45
). Finally, subjects who responded with 1, 2, or 3 out of 7 top p .0002
the question of how difficult it was to remain impartial showed a sig-
nificant effect of fault (mean p .342, , , ).t p 2.3986 df p 32 p p .0225
Men’s self-reported bias (or lack thereof) more strongly predicted
actual bias than did women’s self-reported bias. There were no signifi-
cant differences between reported impartiality between men and women
( , , ). The correlation between the im-t p .9802 df p 44.963 p p .3322
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Figure 2. Distribution of responses to the question, How often did your responses depend
on which party was at fault in the divorce?
partiality measure was .670 for men ( , ,t p 3.828 df p 18 p p
) and .237 for women ( , , ). The.0012 t p 1.844 df p 57 p p .0704
difference between these correlations is significant ( ,z p 2.05 p p
). A total of 62.5 percent of women and 70 percent of men reported.0404
that they did not go against the law in order to punish the wrongdoer.
For women, however, there were no significant differences in the fault
effect for women who said that they did punish (mean p .833) and
those who reported that they did not punish (mean p .624) (t p
, , ). The difference between those who re-.9314 df p 45.634 p p .3565
ported going against the law and those who did not was highly significant
for men, in contrast, even though the total number of male subjects was
only 20 ( , , ). Men who reported that theyt p 3.401 df p 9.988 p p .0068
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Figure 3. Distribution of responses to the question, How difficult was it to ignore the facts
of each case and focus on the law?
did punish showed a significant mean difference of 1.095 ( ,t p 3.962
, ), whereas those who did not made no differentiationdf p 5 p p .0107
between victims’ proposals and wrongdoers’ proposals (mean p .046,
, , ).t p .2416 df p 13 p p .8129
6. EXPERIMENT 4
In this experiment, we want to push subjects to disentangle three factors:
their approach to the negotiation, a judge’s view of the problem, and
the adequacy of no-fault divorce laws for ensuring justice between the
parties.
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6.1. Method
6.1.1. Subjects. A total of 85 subjects, with ages ranging from 21 to
69, responded to a survey on the World Wide Web; they were paid $5
for participation. A total of 24.7 percent of the subjects were male.
6.1.2. Procedure. This experiment was much the same as experiment 3,
with eight scenarios of four questions each and with the gender of the
proposer as well as the gender of the wrongdoer randomized. The in-
structions included the following line: “Assume that the judge goes
strictly by the book and remains impartial even when he thinks the law
is unfair.”
In this experiment, we replaced the crime scenario with another sit-
uation in which one spouse decides that he or she does not want children:
Phil and Carol have been married for 8 years, and they have no children.
They are now getting divorced. Carol wants children, and Phil does not.
When they got married, Phil promised that they would start a family as
soon as their careers were better established, but he has finally admitted
that his career and freedom are too important to him to compromise by
having kids.
Also, in this experiment, subjects answer three questions about each
proposal:
1. How would a judge in a no-fault state evaluate this proposal? Es-
timate the judge’s response on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 p totally
unreasonable, judge will not even consider this proposal; 4 p somewhat
reasonable request that the judge will evaluate in light of all other requests;
and 7 p very reasonable—even generous to the other party—so judge
will almost definitely grant.
2. How reasonable do you think this proposal is? (1 p totally unrea-
sonable; 4 p somewhat reasonable; 7 p very reasonable, even generous
to the other party)
3. Do you think that the no-fault divorce law offers a fair way to deal
with this issue? (1 p The law is very unfair in this situation. 3 p The
law is somewhat fair in this case. 5 p The law is perfectly fair in dealing
with this situation.)
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6.2. Results
In this experiment, we replicated the main fault finding from the previous
three experiments. An average subject predicted that a judge would rate
proposals by victims about a third of a point higher (.332) than the
score for proposals by wrongdoers ( , , ). Sub-t p 5.706 df p 84 p ! .0001
jects’ own assessments (“How reasonable do you think this proposal
is?”) showed an even greater bias, with a mean difference between vic-
tims’ proposals and wrongdoers’ proposals of .521 ( ,t p 8.036 df p
, ). The difference between judges’ ratings and own ratings84 p ! .0001
was significant ( , , ). Fault also affected thet p 3.846 df p 84 p p .0002
ratings of the law’s fairness; subjects found the law slightly fairer for
dealing with victims’ claims than wrongdoers’ claims (mean p .101,
, , ).t p 3.087 df p 84 p p .0027
The average response to the question of fairness was 3.7 of 5. There
was no significant correlation, across all subjects, for subjects with low
ratings for the law’s fairness and a high effect of fault for the questions
regarding a judge’s response ( , , ). The cor-r p .048 df p 83 p p .6655
relation between fairness and subjects’ own ratings was slightly higher
but still not significant across subjects ( , , ).r p .161 df p 83 p p .1412
The average subject response to the legal rule for a given proposal in a
given scenario was 3.7 of 5, where 3 means that the law is somewhat
appropriate for handling the situation and 5 means that the law is totally
adequate in this case. There were almost three times as many responses
of 5 (842 of 2,720) as responses of 1 or 2 combined (319).
7. DISCUSSION
These results indicate that people take marital fault into account when
they make judgments and decisions about divorce negotiations, even
when they are instructed to ignore it. People rate bargaining proposals
from marital wrongdoers as less reasonable than proposals from neutral
parties (parties to faultless divorce) and proposals from victims. Subjects
also estimate that a judge’s assessment would be similarly biased against
the wrongdoer. This effect of fault is diminished, but still significant,
when we ask subjects to rate proposals under conditions, one in which
fault is a permissible factor for a decision and another in which it is
not. Table 3 shows a summary of these results.
Some people report that their bias is the product of a conscious choice,
which reflects an unwillingness to comply with an unfair law. Others
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Table 3. Ratings of Proposals in Unilateral-Fault Scenarios under No-Fault Rules
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Experiment 4
(Judge)
Victims 4.76 4.66 5.02 4.81
Wrongdoers 4.45 4.32 4.42 4.48
Difference .31* .34* .60* .33*
* .p ! .0001
report that they have no intention of punishing the wrongdoer but none-
theless show a large effect of fault in their judgments. Women appear
to have much less insight into their own bias than men do. However,
we do not sample gender well, and the men in this sample may be
unusual, a possibility discussed in more detail below. Finally, subjects
taking the proposer’s perspective rate a proposal higher than those taking
the spouse’s perspective. This difference is greater in unilateral-fault di-
vorces than in neutral or shared-fault divorces.
The question motivating this research was how people respond to a
legal rule that is not in accord with their moral intuition. In these ex-
periments, we see that many people’s instinct is to punish, or at least
disfavor, wrongdoers. Subjects expressed distress that, under the no-fault
law, parties can breach a contract without repercussions. A typical com-
ment was: “Doesn’t seem fair for the party who hasn’t done anything
wrong and hasn’t broken her part of the contract to be treated equally
as the one who has.” Subjects also worried that the permissible consid-
eration of contributions should actually include contributions to the
relationship itself, a factor excluded under the no-fault laws: “No-fault
may make things simpler, but why award one party equal proceeds when
the relationship was never equal to begin with. If you’re going to court,
time should be given to evaluating each person’s contribution to a re-
lationship and compromising.” And, perhaps most commonly, the re-
strictions of the law made subjects angry or frustrated: “In this case,
the no fault is for the birds. Sam was ignorant in thinking he could get
his own way once he was married.” And, in fact, we know that more
than a third of subjects in experiment 3 were willing to intentionally go
against the legal rule in order to punish the wrongdoer, presumably when
they determined that the law would yield an unfair result. This was
somewhat surprising given that the instructions asked subjects to re-
spond from the point of view of an impartial judge following no-fault
rules, but some subjects apparently thought the judge would concur that
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the law was unfair. One subject even said as much; after responding that
she had consciously gone against the law sometimes in order to punish
the wrongdoer, she commented, “I am sure the judge would have done
it, too.”
Nonetheless, we also have evidence that many subjects do not find
the law egregiously unfair and yet respond negatively to the wrongdoer.
One way to think about this result might be in the framework of the
moral heuristic. Most people’s intuition is that a person at fault in a
relationship is not equally entitled to the benefits or proceeds from the
relationship. We might think of this as the system 1 intuition, or perhaps
as the anchoring intuition. The legal framework asks people to override
this intuition, which requires a kind of system 2 correction. The problem,
then, is a failure to fully correct for the heuristic. Or, in the language
of anchoring, the problem is a failure to adequately adjust from the
anchor—in this case, the moral intuition.
Why does it matter if people take fault into account even when they
are instructed to ignore it? If everyone agreed that fault is important
and the law is unreasonable, divorcing parties could make contracts with
one another in accord with their shared moral intuitions. This, in fact,
would be a result in line with Ellickson’s (1991) predictions about the
effects of informal norms. Our results suggest that this is not the case,
even though the norm prohibiting marital misconduct appears to be quite
universal. Subjects are certainly attuned to the informal norm, but they
will turn to the legal rule when it is to their benefit to do so. When
subjects are put in the position of the victim, they rely heavily on the
moral norm as a basis for decision making. However, when subjects
assume the role of the wrongdoer, they adhere to the legal rule.4
There are several limitations based on these methods. The first prob-
lem is that only about a quarter of all subjects were men. However, even
4. In experiment 1, we asked people to assess the reasonableness of various bargaining
positions from the perspective of the husband, the wife, or the judge. Perspective was
important in all cases; people found their own proposals more reasonable than the proposals
of a spouse; subjects taking the perspective of the judge more or less split the difference
and found that a reasonable point lay between those of the opposing parties. When subjects
were assessing proposals in neutral divorces—divorces in which fault was, by definition,
not an issue—they still rated their own proposals higher than others’ proposals. When
subjects took the perspective of the wrongdoer in a divorce, their responses were very
similar, which suggests that wrongdoers are able to behave as though fault is not an issue
in the divorce. Subjects taking the perspective of the victim, however, are significantly more
biased in favor of their own proposals and against those of the spouse (the wrongdoer);
their responses are quite different from the responses in a neutral divorce.
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when analyzing male subjects separately, we found significant effects of
fault that were consistent with responses from female subjects. The sec-
ond limitation of this methodology is that it is somewhat unclear how
generalizable our results are to actual divorce cases; after all, these are
hypothetical scenarios and proposals that in no way affect the subjects’
lives. There is no real cost, for example, to our subjects if they want to
disfavor a wrongdoer, since they will not have to pay any lawyers’ fees.
However, the fact of the fault is almost surely less salient to subjects
reading brief scenarios than it is to people experiencing the dissolution
of a marriage, which would suggest that our results are actually con-
servative. Finally, we do not know whether subjects fully understood
our instructions or the implications of their responses. The results clearly
indicate that subjects were responsive to instructions about whether they
could take fault into account, but they may not understand the cost of
flouting the law. We assume that when parties’ responses are unreason-
able in light of the instructions, they risk impasse and costly litigation.
We conveyed this information in the instructions, but we do not know
if subjects grasped the meaning and if they were more willing to con-
sciously go against the legal rule because they did not understand the
consequences.
Divorce bargaining is bargaining “in the shadow of the law”; it is
both private, in the sense that parties can create almost any contract
that they choose, and public, in that the legal norm affects parties’ ex
ante expectations and entitlements. What happens to that bargaining,
though, when the legal rule is counter to most peoples’ intuitions? This
research indicates that people are resistant to unfair applications of such
a rule, and even when they agree to try to follow it, they are unable to
do so and are often unaware that they have not been successful.
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